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Abstract
Marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) are a favorite instrument to analyze
international emissions trading. This paper focusses on the question of how to
de¯ne MACCs in a general equilibrium context where the global abatement level
in°uences energy prices and in turn national MACCs. We discuss the mechanisms
theoretically and then use the CGE model DART for quantitative simulations. The
result is, that changes in energy prices resulting from di®erent global abatement
levels do indeed a®ect national MACCs. Also, we compare di®erent possibilities of
de¯ning MACCs - of which some are robust against changes in energy prices while
others vary considerably.
Keywords: Climate change, marginal abatement cost curves, energy prices, com-
putable general equilibrium model
JEL classi¯cation: C68, D58, F18, Q41
¤ Corresponding Author. Address: Kiel Institute for World Economics, D-24100 Kiel, Germany; Tele-
phone/Fax: +49-(0)431-8814-485/522; Email: gklepper@ifw-kiel.de
11 Introduction
In the last years marginal abatement cost curves (MACCs) have become a standard
tool to analyze the impacts of the Kyoto Protocol and emissions trading. Once such
curves are available for the di®erent world regions it is very easy to determine permit
prices, total abatement cost and regional emissions for di®erent scenarios of interna-
tional emissions trading. A detailed description of the use of the MACCs is provided
in the papers of Ellerman and Decaux (1998) and Criqui, Mima, and Viguir (1999). A
number of other authors have followed the approach (Blanchard, Criqui, and Kitous
2002; den Elzen and de Moor 2002; Loeschel and Zhang 2002; Lucas, den Elzen, and
van Vuuren 2002; van Steenberghe 2002) analyzing scenarios such as emissions trading
with and without the participation of the USA, the use of market power by Russia and
the Ukraine, multiple gas abatement and banking.
All these studies implicitly assume that each region/country has its unique marginal
abatement cost curve - independent of e.g. the abatement levels of other regions or
whether emissions trading is taking place or not. One justi¯cation for this assumption is
the ¯nding of Ellerman and Decaux (1998) that MACCs are indeed robust with respect
to such policy parameters. This is somehow a surprise as Ellerman and Decaux note
themselves that with international trade the abatement level in one country in°uences
trade °ows such that the MACCs may change in other countries. Their simulations with
the EPPA model though, show that the variation in prices is less than 10% between
di®erent scenarios for any given level of abatement.
Commonly, the marginal abatement cost for a certain abatement level is derived as the
shadow price for the associated emission constraint. As we will discuss, this shadow
price is in°uenced by world energy prices which di®er across di®erent abatement sce-
narios. The reason behind this is that abatement levels in one country in°uence its
energy demand, which might in turn in°uence the world energy price. With, for exam-
ple, higher world energy prices regions automatically demand less energy and emit less
carbon so that the same emission target becomes less binding. The magnitude of the
2di®erence in shadow prices depends on a number of factors such as trade elasticities
and trade structures. This suggests that MACCs depend on world energy prices and
may shift across di®erent abatement scenarios.
Against this background, this paper tries to clarify what MACCs are, what factors
in°uence the MACCs in di®erent scenarios and how the MACCs should be used. In
addition, the problem of choosing the reference point for the MACC is discussed. We
will ¯rst explore the energy price e®ects theoretically in a stylized model and second
quantify them using the computable general equilibrium model DART. The main result
is that not only theoretically MACCs change with varying energy prices, but that the
di®erence can reach a magnitude that cannot be neglected.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next sections de¯nes marginal abatement cost
curves, explains how they are constructed and used in practice and presents estimates
for di®erent regions. Section 3 shows in di®erent settings how shadow prices depend
on energy prices and how this a®ects MACCs. Section 4 introduces the computable
general equilibrium model DART, de¯nes our scenarios and presents the results of the
simulations. Section 7 concludes.
2 Marginal Abatement Cost Curves
The idea of a marginal abatement cost curve (MACC) comes from ¯rm or plant level
models of reducing emissions. In production theory the interpretation is straightfor-
ward. Given that some activities in the production process lead to emissions of unde-
sired substances and given some abatement technology, the marginal abatement costs
represent either the marginal loss in pro¯ts from avoiding the last unit of emissions
or the marginal cost of achieving a certain emission target given some level of output.
Whereas the latter focuses on abatement technologies such as ¯lters for air or water
pollutants, the former concept is more interested in the overall adjustment of a ¯rm to
an emission constraint including adjustments in the level of output (McKitrick 1999).
3The concept of a MACC has been adopted recently for climate policy analyses in the
context of a general equilibrium framework. It is argued that an economy as a whole
can be treated like a production plant, and hence the concept of a MACC can be applied
analogously. Intuitively then, a MACC for an economy represents the social cost of a
the last unit of emissions abated in the economy.
As most empirical studies using economy wide MACCs are concerned with CO2 abate-
ment a number of problems disappear. For CO2, economical capture or sequestration
technologies currently do not exist. Therefore, the question of abatement activities can
be ignored and the notion of a MACC in terms of abatement cost at a given output
level makes little sense in this case. CO2 abatement is possible only through a reduction
in the use of fossil fuels combined with adjustments in other inputs and a reduction in
output. In addition, CO2 emissions occur in ¯xed proportions to the burning of the
di®erent fossil fuels. This makes a ¯rm level MACC for CO2 almost trivial and the
interpretation of an economy wide MACC somewhat easier.
In practice, MACCs are constructed and used without further re°ecting the theoretical
concepts. Two general types of models are used to analyze climate policies as well as
to generate MACCs for di®erent regions. The ¯rst approach is denoted top-down and
is based on aggregated microeconomic models. The models are most often computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models that may carry a detailed representation of the en-
ergy sector. Bottom-up models on the other hand are based on an engineering approach
that analyzes the di®erent technical potentials for emission reductions in detail.
In a CGE model, the marginal abatement cost is de¯ned as the shadow cost that is
produced by a constraint on carbon emissions for a given region and a given time. This
shadow cost is equal to the tax that would have to be levied on the emissions to achieve
the targeted level or the price of an emission permit in the case of emissions trading.
The more severe the constraint, the higher the marginal abatement costs are. Marginal
abatement costs curves are obtained, when the costs associated with di®erent levels of
reductions are generated. Ellerman and Decaux (1998) use the EPPA model and run
it with proportional reductions by all OECD countries of 1, 5, 10, 15, 20, 30 and 40
4percent of 2010 emissions and ¯t simple analytical curves to the sets of plots. They ¯nd
that each region has a unique curve independently of how the other regions behave and
independent of how the reductions are implemented (emissions trading versus regional
constraints).
Besides the EPPA-MACCs many models (Boehringer and Loeschel 2001; Blanchard,
Criqui, and Kitous 2002; Criqui, Mima, and Viguir 1999; Loeschel and Zhang 2002)
use curves generated from the energy systems model POLES (Criqui, Cattier, Menan-
teau, and Quidoz 1996) which is mainly a bottom-up model. Here, the MACCs are
constructed the other way around. Di®erent levels of a "shadow carbon tax" are levied
on all areas of fossil fuel use. Via technological or implicit behavioral changes and the
replacements in the energy conversion systems for which the technologies are explicitly
de¯ned in POLES, this leads to adjustments in the ¯nal energy demand and to the
corresponding levels of emission reductions.
Another rather ad-hoc approach to estimate MACCs is used by Ghersi (2001). He
uses the shadow costs for the two scenarios where Kyoto is ¯rst implemented through
unilateral emission reductions and second by international emissions trading which are
reported for twelve di®erent models a±liated to the Energy Modelling Forum (Weyant
1999). This approach is only valid though, if the MACCs are indeed robust against
changes of policy.
Taken together, the literature shows that the MACCs vary considerably across di®erent
models and depend on the di®erent model types and model assumptions e.g. on baseline
growth and baseline emissions. Nevertheless, all models more or less produce the same
ranking of marginal abatement costs across economies.
In the literature there are two ways to visualize MACCs: either with absolute emission
reductions on the abscissa or with percentage reductions relative to the benchmark in a
certain year (usually 2010). Figure 1 shows the marginal abatement cost curves for the
Annex B regions of the DART model, when each country unilaterally undertakes an
emission reduction in both graphical visualizations. For a comparison we also include
5some curves from the EPPA and the POLES model1 taken from Criqui et al. (1999)
and Ellerman and Decaux (1998). Although the curves di®er across models, they result
in the same ranking. The same amount of emission reductions is cheapest in the USA,
followed by Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FEB) and Western Europe
(WEU). The reductions are most expensive in Japan (JPN) and the remaining Annex
B countries (ANC = Canada, Australia, New Zealand). Regarding relative targets, the
same percentage reduction relative to the benchmark is more equal across the regions
but di®ers more across models. To keep the ¯gure clear, we only included the EPPA
curves for WEU and the USA. Abatement is again most expensive in Japan, followed
now by Western Europe and the USA, ANC and ¯nally FEB.
[Insert Figure 1: Typical marginal abatement cost curves]
It is clear that MACCs are in°uenced by factors such as the initial level of energy
prices, the energy supply structure and the potential for developing carbon free energy
resources (Criqui, Mima, and Viguir 1999). Also, den Elzen and Both (2002) note
that it is well possible that MACCs are dependent of the behavior of the rest of the
world. Nevertheless, these issues have not been explored yet. We will discuss in the
next section for di®erent settings, how MACCs depend on world fossil fuel prices and
how they have to be de¯ned in a general equilibrium context.
3 The Role of Fossil Fuel Prices
Although the ¯rst intuition for regional MACCs, discussed in the last section, sounds
convincing, there exist a number of traps if one tries to de¯ne in exact terms the
idea of a MACC for an economy. The main aspect di®erentiating ¯rm level MACCs
from economy wide MACCs is the treatment of prices. At ¯rm level output and input
prices are exogenously given. Hence, the marginal abatement costs of meeting a certain
emission target consist of a combination of output reduction and end-of-pipe emission
1The curves from the EPPA and the POLES model are only approximated from graphs and not
generated using the exact data. Also, the regional aggregation is not exactly the same across models.
6reductions, all evaluated at given prices. In a general equilibrium framework though,
many prices are determined endogenously. One could in analogue to the ¯rm level
approach evaluate the MACC at constant prices. This would constitute an appropriate
approach as long as only marginal costs in the neighborhood of the original equilibrium
are evaluated. For the marginal cost of larger emission reductions it is likely that goods
and factor prices will change. As social costs are clearly determined by the variable
prices, taking the de¯nition of the MACC seriously implies to work with variable prices.
As mentioned, MACCs are linked to shadow costs of emission constraints. These are
thus the starting point for our theoretical analysis. In order to highlight issues that
need to be taken into account when MACCs for an economy are to be derived we start
with the ¯rm level and then extended the approach to a whole economy. In a ¯nal
step, we discuss the implications for MACCs derived from the shadow costs based on
di®erent approaches.
Emission constraints at ¯rm level
Suppose, there is a ¯rm that uses capital K, labor L, and fossil fuels F as inputs in the
production of its output X. Input prices are exogenously given by r, w, and pF. The
price of X is without loss of generality set to 1. The technology is given by a production
function G with positive but decreasing marginal products for all inputs. CO2 emissions
e depend on the amount of fossil fuel used in production, i.e. e = ¶F where ¶ denotes
the emission coe±cient for F. With this simple emission function, constraining e is
equivalent to restricting the input F. The pro¯t maximization problem of the ¯rm is
max(K;L;F)¼(X) = G(K;L;F) ¡ rK ¡ wL ¡ pFF ¡ ¸(e ¡ ¶F) (1)












= pF + ¸¶ (4)
¶F = e (5)
7With F¤ = e=¶ given by equation (7), the optimal K¤(w;r;pF;e) and L¤(w;r;pF;e)
are determined by equations (4) and (5). By de¯nition, ¸ is the shadow price of the













[GF ¡ pF] (6)
As as @G
@e = Ge = 1
¶GF is the value of the marginal product of e to the ¯rm, ¸ + 1
¶pF
is thus nothing but the "social" costs of the emission constraint. For an unconstrained
emission level e0 the social cost would be the same as the private cost, which is 1
¶pF





@2F < 0 and ¸
increases with a stricter target e0 < e. Whether the curve of di®erent shadow costs ¸(e)
is convex, which is mostly assumed, depends on the properties of G. ¸(e) is strictly




Emission constraints in a small open economy
Using the same approach we can also model emission constraints in a general equilibrium
context of a small open economy that faces ¯xed world prices. The economy is now
endowed with ¯xed amounts ¹ K and ¹ L of the two factors capital and labor which are
internationally immobile and have market returns r and w. In addition, there is an
intermediate input2 F (fossil fuel) that is used in the production of the ¯nal good X.
The use of F is again associated with emissions of ¶F. Both goods are produced with
a constant returns to scale technology. Again, X uses K;L and F and we denote the
production function by G. F only uses K and L and the production function for F is
F = H(K;L) (7)
Both G and H are increasing, concave and linearly homogeneous. We choose X as
a numeraire with price one and assume that the world market price of F is pF. The
equilibrium is determined by the zero-pro¯t conditions for both sectors X and F, the
full employment conditions for factors K and L and market clearing for the domestic
use of F and the consumption of good X. Introducing an emission constraint, leads to
2F is now treated as an intermediate input, as we can think of fossil fuels as being extracted from
a resource stock by using capital and labor. CGE models usually use this approach as does DART.
8a shadow cost of emissions in the pro¯t maximization of X which we again denote ¸.
As it is more convenient to use cost functions, we work directly with the gross price of
F which is p := pF + ¶¸. Also, we need to di®erentiate between the total production
of F and the domestic use FD. If we de¯ne FI as fossil fuel imports (resp. exports if
negative), then FD = F + FI. The unit cost functions are now de¯ned as:
cF(w;r) = min(K;L) (rK + wL : H(K;L) = 1) (8)
cX(w;r;p) = min(K;L;FD) (rK + wL + pFD) : G(K;L;FD) = 1) (9)
The following six equations then de¯ne the equilibrium. The ¯rst two are the free entry
or zero pro¯t conditions that result from the constant return to scale technologies.
The next three are the full employment respectively market clearing conditions for the
factors and the intermediate good. The last equation is the constraint on e.
cF(w;r) = pF (10)
cX(w;r;p) = 1 (11)
@cF(w;r)
@w
(FD ¡ FI) +
@cX(w;r;p)
@w
X = ¹ L (12)
@cF(w;r)
@r
(FD ¡ FI) +
@cX(w;r;p)
@r
X = ¹ K (13)
@cX(w;r;p)
@p
X = FD (14)
¶FD = e (15)
The exogenous parameters are the factor endowments ¹ K and ¹ L, the world market price
pF for F and the emission level e which directly determines FD = e=¶. Besides FD, the
endogenous variables are X;FI;w;r and ¸. The ¯rst two equations can be solved for
equilibrium factor prices w¤ and r¤ as a function of the exogenous parameter pF and of
¸¤. With factor prices then determined the next two equations together with FD = e=¶
solve for X¤ and F¤ as a function of pF; ¹ K; ¹ L;e and of ¸¤. ¸¤ is determined by the ¯fth
equation and depends on pF; ¹ K; ¹ L;e and pF. Adding an income equation would deliver
us the amount of X that is consumed domestically.
While on ¯rm level an exogenous change of pF to pF ¡ ¢ leads to a change of ¸ to
¸ + ¢=¶ so that the gross price of fossil fuel under an emission constraint remains the




(1 + C(e;pF)) (16)
C is a constant that depends on the level of the emission target e. The ¯rst term
dpF
¶
captures the e®ects that were already present at ¯rm level: to keep the demand for F in
the X sector constant, the change in pF is accompanied by the same change in ¸ scaled
by the emission factor. But now, a decrease (or increase) in pF does not only change the
input price of F in the X sector, but also the world market price of X in relation to the
price of F, which represents the terms of trade. For non-nested production functions
it is possible to show that C(e;pF) > 03. Note also, that the change in ¸ captures two
e®ects: the fall in input prices in the X sector and a shift of production between the
two sectors which corresponds to the decrease in output in the ¯rm level example.
There are other analogies to the ¯rm level case. It is possible to show (Copeland
and Taylor 2003; Woodland 1982) that the system of equations (10)-(15) is equiva-
lent to maximizing the national income function where the underlying technology T is
described by the production functions G and H and the emission constraint:
GDP( ¹ K; ¹ L;pF;e) = max(X;F)(X + pFF : (X;F) 2 T(X;F;e)) (17)
A useful property of the GDP function is that the returns to capital and labor are
obtained by di®erentiating with respect to the relevant factor endowment.
@GDP( ¹ K; ¹ L;pF;e)
@K
= r




@GDP( ¹ K; ¹ L;pF;e=¶)
@F









and the GDP function analogous to the production or output function in the ¯rm level
case. This relationship can also be used to determine the marginal change in GDP due
3This is shown in the appendix. For general (including nested) production functions we were unable
to determine the sign of C(e;pF). As C(e;pF) captures the terms of trade e®ect, the intuition suggests
that always C(e;pF) > 0: With a decrease in pF the economy will tend to produce more X and less
F, increasing the demand for FD in the X sector. This in turn will increase ¸ even further.
10to a marginal change in the emission target:















(¸(e) + pF=¶)de =
Z e0
e¤
¸(e)de + (e0 ¡ e¤)pF=¶ (21)
Thus, the area under the MACC is only one part of the total loss in GDP.
Emission constraints in a large open economy
The next step would be to skip the assumption of exogenous world market prices and
to assume a large open economy. As the algebra of an appropriate model becomes very
tedious while the basic e®ects remain the same, we will only give the intuition of the
di®erences to the small economy case.
A corresponding scenario for an exogenous shock on pF would be the introduction of
a stricter environmental policy abroad which reduces the foreign demand for F and in
turn drives down pF. As the relative price of X increases, the domestic country shifts
factors from the F to the X sector and increases the output of X. At the same time,
as F becomes cheaper, the X sector will use more F and less labor and capital. These
two e®ects, which are the same as in the case of the small open economy and which are
re°ected in equation (16), will increase the domestic demand for F. To keep emissions
and thus F on a constant level ¸ has to rise. The only di®erence to the small economy
case is now that with less F and more X being produced domestically, the price of X
decreases relative to the price of F, which implies that pF rises. Part of the external
decrease in pF is o®set by the domestic shift of production which decreases ¸. Thus,
in a large open economy an external shock on pF also a®ects ¸ but this e®ect is less
severe than in a small open economy because of an adaptation of the terms of trade.
Summarized, it is thus not pF that in°uences the domestic shadow cost but the emission
constraint within the economy e and the emission constraints in the rest of the world
e¤ that determine pF. The in°uence of di®erent emission constraints in the rest of the








An interpretation of MACCs
So far, we have avoided the term MACC in this theoretical part and only talked about
shadow costs of emission constraints. We will now discuss how these can be used to
derive MACCs under changing fossil fuel prices. Again, we start at the ¯rm level, where
the implications of di®erent de¯nitions can be illustrated using a social cost curve.
At ¯rm level all prices are exogenous. The relationship between the price of of fossil










This implies that for given factor and output prices, ¸(e) + 1
¶pF, the social costs of
constraining energy use and emissions at e is simply the sum of the fossil fuel price
divided by the emission coe±cient for CO2 and the shadow price of the constraint. For
the cases of a small and a large open economy the relation between pF and ¸(e) is not
linear anymore. Nevertheless, as equations (16) and (22) show they are still closely
linked. Figure 2 shows a typical social cost function.
[Insert Figure 2]
The graph of the social cost is composed of the market price of fossil fuel measured
in emission units and the shadow price of the emission constraint. Now take the case
given in equation (23). If no emission constraint is imposed this curve simply depicts
the unconstrained emission levels at alternative fossil fuel prices. E.g., at some fossil
fuel price pF=¶ the emissions would be e0(pF); similarly for (pF ¡ ¢)=¶ they would be
e0(pF¡¢). If an emission target of e¤ is imposed (as it is the case in the Kyoto Protocol)
the social cost is - irrespectively of the prevailing price of fossil fuels - represented by
point B on the social cost curve. For pF=¶, ¸(e¤;pF) is the part of the social cost that
represents the shadow cost of the emission constraint. For (pF ¡¢)=¶ this part increases
12by ¢=¶. Hence, marginal abatement costs depend to a large degree on the underlying
fossil fuel price.
There are now two ways in which the traditional MACCs can be derived from this
social cost function. The ¯rst way consists of showing the MACC in terms of units
of emissions abated, i.e. the di®erence between unconstrained emissions and the con-
strained emissions (¯gure 3a). The MACCs, as usually drawn, would have A as the
origin and take the mirror image of the graph of AB in ¯gure 2. This graph would
be de¯ned for a speci¯c price pF. In the case of a di®erent reference situation (e.g.
due to other policies outside the economy under consideration which result in di®erent
fossil fuel prices) such as pF ¡ ¢ the new graph would be A0B0. The two graphs are
illustrated in Figure 3a. In such a representation of MACCs all curves go through the
origin but they have di®erent shapes depending on the fossil fuel price at the reference
point of no emission control. Figure 3a also shows that the same abatement e®ort a
has di®erent marginal abatement costs depending on the initial fossil fuel price and,
therefore, di®erent initial emissions levels4.
[Insert Figure 3]
The second variant of the graph of a MACC is the representation in emission levels as
shown in ¯gure 3b. In this case the abscissa of the social cost representation is kept.
However, the graphs of AB and A0B0 are shifted downward by the fossil fuel price at
the reference situation. Hence, this MACC represents the shadow price of an emission
level, i.e. net of the fossil fuel price. A certain abatement e®ort a := e0(pF) ¡ e¤ =
e0(pF ¡ ¢) ¡ e0 would either have marginal costs depicted by B (for an initial pF) or
by B0 (for an initial pF ¡ ¢).
In analog to the ¯rst variant of a MACC it is also possible to de¯ne a third variant
with relative (instead of absolute) abatement on the abscissa. As this simply implies
a re-scaling respectively a monotonic transformation of the MACCs in ¯gure 3a, the
qualitative results remain the same for such MACCs.
4Note that B
00 equals B on the social cost curve in ¯gure 2.
13Finally, ¯gure 2 can be used to illustrate the loss in output (corresponding to a loss in
GDP in a small open economy). The area e0(pF)AO represents the cost of fossil fuels,
measured in units of emissions. The additional loss due to the emission target is the
area e¤BAe0(pF). It equals the area under the MACC(e;pF) which is e¤BA in ¯gure
3b plus the abated emissions a = e¤ ¡ e0(pF) multiplied by pF=¶.
For the purpose of illustrating the impact of the reference situation for deriving the
MACC, consider the Kyoto commitment of a relatively small country like Japan. One
could derive the MACC by assuming that the rest of the world does not impose any
emission constraint and Japan increases its abatement by the quantity a. The MACCs
in ¯gure 3a and 3b would be represented by the graph AB. Alternatively, one could
start with the AXB countries meeting the Kyoto targets and derive the Japan MACC
from that reference situtation. This reference situation would consist of a lower fossil
fuel price pF ¡ ¢ and result in a graph like A0B0 in both ¯gure 3a and 3b. The
quantity of emissions abated and the corresponding cost of the Kyoto Protocol would
be B on the upper graph of ¯gure 3a in the ¯rst case and B on the lower graph of the
same ¯gure in the second case. I.e., in the AXB reference situation more abatement
quantities and higher prices are required than in the unilateral reference situation. In
the alternative representation of ¯gure 3b the emission target of the Kyoto Protocol is
e* and the corresponding MACCs would either be represented by AB (the left graph)
or by A0B0B00 (the graph on the right). In this case the higher baseline emissions due
to the negative demand e®ect on fossil fuels of the AXB countries meeting their Kyoto
targets becomes apparent through higher baseline emissions e0(pF ¡ ¢).
The question of robustness of MACCs can now be addressed either by looking at the
di®erence in costs for a certain abatement a such as B and B0 in ¯gure 3a. Or one could
ask for the robustness of the marginal cost estimate for meeting a certain cap such as
e¤. In this case the di®erence of the points B and B00 on the two graphs of both ¯gure
3a and 3b are assessed.
When moving to a general equilibrium setting in a small open economy, the resource
constraint on capital and labor needs to be accounted for. The economy now faces an
14economy wide emissions constraint, a given factor endowment, and exogenous world
market prices. As shown in equation (16) changes in pF and changes in shadow prices
¸ are in this case not linearly independent due to the term C(e;pF). As a result, the
social cost of a certain emission constraint depends on pF and there is - di®erent to
the ¯rm level case - not one single social cost curve but one curve for each pF. This is
shown in ¯gure 4. Here, the dotted curve represents the unconstrained emissions that
are associated with di®erent pF. If emissions are now constraint at some given pF the
social cost curve for that pF starts at A. For a di®erent pF ¡ ¢ it starts at A0. The
MACCs corresponding to the MACCs for the ¯rm level in ¯gure 3a, are the curves
going again through AB and A0B0. The MACCs corresponding to the curves in ¯gure
3b are now AB and A0B0C.
The most complex case is the one of a large open economy where world market prices
become endogenous. Thinking, e.g., of a two country model, the only exogenous pa-
rameters are now the factor endowments and policies. With respect to climate policy, it
is not pF that in°uences the domestic social costs of a certain emission constraint e and
any derived MACC but the emission constraints in the rest of the world ¹ e. Together,
e and ¹ e then determine pF. The mechanisms through which the economies interact in
the world economy become quite complex now. A set of emission constraints (e; ¹ e) can
be used to derive ¯rst a particular social cost curve. This curve now results - for a given
¹ e and for varying levels of e - in variable fossil fuel prices pF since these prices are not
only determined by ¹ e (as in the small country case) but also by e itself. Hence, fossil
fuel prices vary along a particular social cost curve. This makes the derivation of the
part that is not inherent in the fossil fuel price (the MAC) more complex and implies
that fossil fuel prices vary along any derived MACC as well. Again the question is as
to whether this endogeneity really shows up in empirically derived curves.
If it does, it has consequences for using MACCs. Take an example with two economies,
"home" with target e and "foreign" with target ¹ e. Suppose the MACCh(e; ¹ e) for home
is derived by varying e for a given ¹ e which is a straightforward exercise. The problem
is, there is no corresponding MACCf(e; ¹ e) of the foreign economy as each emission
15constraint e will result in a di®erent MACCf(e; ¹ e). That means to each point on
MACCh(e; ¹ e) corresponds a particular MACCf(e; ¹ e) and vice versa. In that sense the
exercise of using several regional MACCs for establishing shadow prices of emission
constraints or for deriving trade °ows in an emissions trading system must fail unless
the MACCs are insensitive enough with respect to the emission level abroad.
4 Empirical Results
To quantify the strength of the shifts in the MACCs in di®erent scenarios for di®erent
regions, we use the CGE model DART.
4.1 Simulations with the DART Model
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) model is a multi-region, multi-sector
recursive dynamic CGE model of the world economy developed at the Kiel Institute
for World Economics to analyze climate policies. In the version used for this paper it
covers 11 sectors and 12 regions and the two production factors labor and capital. The
regional aggregation for this study includes the USA, Japan (JPN), Western Europe
(WEU), the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (FEB), and the remaining Annex
B parties (ANC: Australia, New Zealand, Canada), that agreed to emission reductions
in the Kyoto Protocol. The economic structure of the DART model is fully speci¯ed
for each region and covers production, ¯nal consumption and investment. For a more
detailed model description see Klepper et al. (2003).
We now use the DART model to quantify the e®ects of di®erent reference scenarios
on the location and shape of the MACCs. Many di®erent reference situations can be
imagined. Since the Kyoto Protocol is an often used simulation scenario we compute
the MACCs for the year 2010 at which the Kyoto commitments will be binding. We
choose two scenarios for which we compute the MACC:5
5We do not consider emissions trading here, as with emissions trading the abatement levels of all
countries change in comparison to the unilateral action scenario and are dependent on the participants
16UNI In the UNI scenario a country reduces its emissions whereas all other countries
are assumed to follow a growth path without any emission constraint.
AXB All Annex B countries, except the region for which the MACC is constructed,
reduce emissions according to their Kyoto commitment6. The reductions are
achieved by unilateral emission taxes. As in our model FEB does not reach its
target emissions in 2010 they do not face reductions.
For these two scenarios two sets of numbers are computed. The UNI set consists of the
results of a unilateral emission reduction schedule between the unconstrained emissions
and a 40% reduction relative to benchmark emissions in each of the ¯ve Annex B regions
mentioned above. The targets are varied in steps of ¯ve percentage points. The AXB
set consists of the same reductions in each region but under the assumptions that the
other Annex B regions meet their Kyoto target.
These data are then used to compute the three representations of MACCs as discussed
above. The results for these curves are given in the Appendix tables 1 and 2. Table
1 corresponds to the MACCs shown in ¯gure 3b. Table 2 shows the numbers for the
¯gure 3a, once in terms of abated quantities and once as the percentage abated relative
to the unconstrained emissions in the respective scenario.
4.2 Simulation Results
The numbers in Annex Table 1 are based on absolute emission targets for each region
and thus resemble the MACCs in ¯gure 3b. The unconstrained emission level in the
scenario UNI di®ers from that of the scenario AXB and thus the points A and A0 in
¯gure 3b represent UNI and AXB. The emission target e¤ (¯gure 3b) could be the Kyoto
in the trading scheme. We would thus not only see a shift in MACCs, but also a move along one curve.
As the focus of this paper is on the shift of the curves, we restrict ourselves to the non-trading case.
6The Kyoto targets applied in this study are the targets induced by the agreements in Bonn and
Marrakech and include sinks. We use the reductions cited in Boehringer (2001) and derive the targets
for our regional aggregation using IEA emission data. The targets are relative to 1990 emission: USA:
96.8%, WEU: 94.8%, ANC: 109%, JPN: 99.2% and FEB 103%.
17target marked with an asterix in table 1. The points B and B00 would correspond to the
MAC of Kyoto under UNI and AXB. It is clear that meeting the target e* would require
di®erent abatement levels under the two reference scenarios for computing MACCs. In
contrast, the point B0 in ¯gure 3b would represent the same abatement level under
AXB as under UNI. However, it would not lead to the same emission target.
Table 2a shows the quantities for the MACCs in terms of abatement levels as represented
in ¯gure 3a. The origin of the graphs of the MACCs represents the unconstrained
emission levels both in UNI and in AXB. Notice, however, that the origin of the two
curves refers to di®erent baseline emissions with AXB levels being higher than UNI
levels. If we again take the Kyoto target for a particular region, e.g. Japan, that
corresponds to a reduction of about 80 MtC. The point B in ¯gure 3a would then
result in MACs of 116.13 USD, whereas point B0 - the same abatement level under
scenario AXB - would result in MACs of 104.35 USD.
Similarly shaped graphs of MACCs as in ¯gure 3a would emerge from the numbers in
table 2b. The di®erence is in the scaling of the abscissa7. It should be kept in mind
that drawing the MACCs in relative changes yields again di®erent abatement levels
since the baseline in UNI and AXB di®ers. Hence, a certain percentage reduction of x
percent would not represent the same absolute reduction in both scenarios.
There are now essentially three ways of de¯ning robustness of the MACCs corresponding
to the three representations. The ¯rst which is probably used by Ellerman and Decaux
(1998) refers to the representation in percentage reductions and compares a certain
percentage reduction of a% in the two scenarios, hence it compares B0 and B in ¯gure
3a when drawn not in levels abated but in percentages abated. The second would do
the same exercise in absolute abatement levels, hence comparing B and B0 in ¯gure 3a.
Finally, one can compare the two MACCs in terms of a certain emission target, e.g.
the Kyoto target. This would result in a comparison of B and B00 which both represent
the same emission target under the two scenarios.
7To be precise, the move from absolute to relative targets does not only imply a re-scaling of the
abscissa, but also a shift in the relative position of the two MACCs since the reference situations have
di®erent emission levels.
18When we compute these di®erences it turns out that the ¯rst approach to checking
robustness would always result in deviations of less than 10% in the simulations of
DART, supporting the results of Ellerman and Decaux (1998). In fact, the di®erence
is in most countries even below 5%, and only reaches 6% resp. 7% in Japan and ANC.
In the second approach with ¯xed absolute abatement relative to the unconstrained
emissions, the di®erence is still below 10% in most cases and only reaches 11 - 13%
for high abatement levels in Japan and ANC. The third variant, however, leads to
substantial di®erences in the MACs for a given emission target, that can reach up to
50% for low abatement levels. For example, in WEU, JPN and ANC the di®erence
between the MAC based on the UNI and one based on the AXB reference for the
Kyoto target is above 20%.
In addition, corresponding to the theoretical ¯ndings, the simulation results show qual-
itatively di®erent moves of the MACC UNI to the MACC AXB in the three represen-
tations. As an example, ¯gure 5 depicts these three representations for Japan.
[Insert Figure 5]
For ¯xed emission targets (table 1, ¯gure 5c) we can see that the MACC is indeed
shifted upward through lower fossil fuel prices in AXB as shown in ¯gure 3b. Since
we are computing the general equilibrium e®ects the presentation in the simpli¯ed
framework of the ¯rm level MACC needs to be checked against the social cost curves as
shown in ¯gure 4. In fact, the numbers computed and the graphs of ¯gure 5 show that
the shape of the MACCs which would be determined by the adjustment in the terms-
of-trade does not signi¯cantly change. Hence, the two social cost curves shown in ¯gure
4 have very similar shape. This indicates that the major in°uence on the robustness of
MACCs is induced by the fossil fuel price e®ect of di®erent reference scenarios and not
by the endogeneity of those prices in a general equilibrium framework. One should be
aware, however, that we are computing rather small changes in relative prices based on
actual policy proposals. For larger changes the general equilibrium e®ects may need to
be taken into account when assessing the robustness of MACCs.
19The strength of the shift imposed by di®erent reference scenarios varies, depending
on the region, between 2 and 14 USD/tC. It is in°uenced among other things by each
countries share of Annex B emissions and the importance of energy exports or imports8
In the case of the USA, for example, the shift is much smaller (around 5 USD/tC)
than for Japan (around 14 USD/tC). The parallel shift also explains, why the relative
di®erence between the two MACCS is higher for lower abatement levels.
In the case of MACCs in terms of emissions abated (table 2, ¯gure 5a & b) the move from
UNI to AXB turns the the MACC clockwise around the origin. Finally, the di®erence
between UNI and AXB is from this point of view much smaller then the di®erence for
¯xed emission targets. Again, this corresponds to the graphical example where the
di®erence between B and B0 in ¯gure 3a is smaller then the di®erence between B and
B00 in ¯gure 3b. As a result MACCs in terms of abatement levels are robust, while
MACCs in terms of emission targets are not.
5 Conclusions
In the previous sections we have shown theoretically and empirically how marginal
abatement cost curves depend on abatement levels in the rest of the world via changes
in international fossil fuel prices. We also discussed three di®erent possibilities to derive
graphs for MACCs from the social cost curves of emission restrictions: in terms of emis-
sion targets, in terms of absolute abatement relative to the unconstrained emission level
and ¯nally in terms of relative (percentage) abatement relative to the unconstrained
emission levels. For each of these approaches one can de¯ne measures of robustness
with respect to the reference situation of the simulation exercise. It turns out that even
though in all cases MACCs react to energy prices, this reaction is rather small in the
two latter cases, so that the MACCs in terms of absolute or relative abatement levels
can be termed robust. The MACCs in terms of emission targets though, may change
considerably.
8See Klepper & Peterson (2003) for a detailed discussion on the factors in°uencing the strength of
the shift.
20The question remains whether there is one "true" representation of a MACC. We believe
this is not the case, since the three representations refer to three di®erent ways of
looking at the problem. The MACCs in terms of absolute or relative abatement levels
show the marginal cost of a certain reduction level starting from a particular reference
situation that is not explicitly shown in such graphs. Hence, the impact of fossil fuel
prices on the overall social cost is not very transparent. Such MACCs turn out to be
quite robust, mainly because absolute and relative abatement levels are taken without
reference to particular emission targets. However, the costs of reaching, e.g., the Kyoto
target with a ¯xed emission level, may be better illustrated with the MACCs shown in
terms of emission levels. These graphs implicitly take into account the e®ect of di®erent
reference situations in°uencing fossil fuel prices. They are less robust, mainly because
for reaching a certain emission target the abatement levels need to be varied under
di®erent reference situations thus leading to an ampli¯cation of marginal costs.
Instead of using the MACCs one could directly refer to the social cost curve for achieving
a certain emission target. This approach explicitly takes into account the interaction of
marginal abatement costs and fossil fuel prices. In addition, it is the social cost curve
that is used to determine the welfare loss in terms of GDP of a certain emission target
- not any of the MACCs. As the social cost is the sum of the fossil fuel price and the
marginal abatement cost, the information of MACs alone - not accompanied by the
associated fossil fuel prices - is of little help.
The theoretical part has shown that in the setting of open economies unique social cost
curves of emissions only exist for a particular fossil fuel price - in the case of a small
open economy - or for a particular emission level in the rest of the world - in the case of a
large open economy. They de¯ne a set of curves as illustrated in ¯gure 4. For empirical
purposes, however, the simulations have shown that the di®erences in the shapes of
these curves are very small when compared to the di®erences imposed by the fossil fuel
prices. The discussion about the robustness of MACCs is in fact concerned with the
shape of di®erent social cost curve at di®erent segments of these curves. In contrast,
the open economy e®ects on the social cost curve determine the distance between the
21social cost curves under di®erent reference scenarios which do hardly change the shape
of a MACC. In summary, the robustness of MACCs with respect to di®erent reference
situations is something to check when transferring MACCs derived from a particular
simulation exercise to other policy scenarios. The international relative price e®ects of
the open economy framework, on the other hand, do not seem to a®ect MACCs in a
signi¯cant way.
A Shift of the MACC in a small open economy
In this section we show how the MACC for a given emission target ¹ e shifts with a
change in the exogenous price of the fossil fuel pF. To facilitate the notation we de¯ne







jj0 i = F;X; j;j0 = w;r;p
Note that 8i;j
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j2 < 0 (24)
For better readability we repeat the system of equations describing the equilibrium in
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with j ¢ j = det(¢)
Developing A¸ by the third row we obtain:


















































































































j > 0 and due to (30) a1;a4 < 0 and a2;a3 > 0 the last two terms (including the









pw = 0 so that the ¯rst term is
zero and jBj > 0. For more complicated production functions that are e.g. nested, the
sign of the ¯rst term depends on the assumptions about the capital intensity in F and
X (second bracket) and the input elasticities in the production of X (¯rst bracket).






























































































































































































The ¯rst term is negative as cX
p2 < 0. The third and the forth term are negative due to
(30) and as a1;a4 < 0 and a2;a3 > 0. For simple Cobb-Douglas and CES functions ,




































24Thus together jAj < 0. For more complicated production functions, additional assump-
tions are again necessary to determine the sign of the second term.





















For given K;L and pF the original equilibrium values for w;r;X and FI depend on the
emission target e. Thus both B;A and also jBj;jAj vary with the emission target. For
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Figure 4: Social cost curves in a small open economy
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Figure 5: The MACCs for Japan in three di®erent representations
32Table 1: Marginal abatement cost curves - I
Emission MAC in USD
Target in GtC UNI AXB



































33Table 2: Marginal abatement cost curves - IIa and IIb
Reduction1 MAC in USD
in GtC UNI AXB





























Reduction1 MAC in USD
in % UNI AXB





























1 Reduction rel. to the unconstrained emissions that di®er between UNI and AXB
¤ Reduction that leads to Kyoto target in UNI
34